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 Plaintiffs U.S. Citizens Association, James Grapek, and Maurice Thompson hereby 
move this Honorable Court for summary judgment in their favor on Count I, the sole count 
remaining for decision, in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.  There are no genuine 
issues of material fact, and judgment may therefore be entered as a matter of law.  See Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Shavrnoch v. Clark Oil and Refining Corp., 726 F.2d 291, 293 
(6th Cir. 1984). 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Pub. L. No. 111-148, H.R. 3590), as 
amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (Pub. L. No. 111-152, H.R. 
4871) (collectively, the “PPACA”), exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, 
Section 8 and violates the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.   
In the PPACA, for the first time in American history, Congress presumes itself 
possessed of an enumerated power to compel Americans to purchase a private product, health 
insurance.  But Article I, Section 8 includes no such enumerated power.  For the first time, 
Congress has deemed the Commerce Clause a basis to regulate inactivity.  That clause has 
never been extended to reach inactivity and, if the reach is condoned, then the regulatory 
power of Congress will be limitless, contrary to controlling precedent (indeed, every case 
decided by the Supreme Court that interprets the Commerce Clause).  See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995); see, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-80 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); United 
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States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. 1, 37 (1937).    
In July 2009, the Congressional Research Service candidly admitted the absence of 
constitutional precedent to support the PPACA’s Individual Mandate: 
Despite the breadth of powers that have been exercised under the Commerce 
Clause, it is unclear whether the clause would provide a solid constitutional 
foundation for legislation containing a requirement to have health insurance.  
Whether such a requirement would be constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause is perhaps the most challenging question posed by such a proposal, as it 
is a novel issue whether Congress may use this clause to require an individual 
to purchase a good or a service. 
 
See Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance:  
A Constitutional Analysis, Cong. Res. Serv., at 3 (July 24, 2009).1  Not surprisingly, three 
courts have now found that the Individual Mandate exceeds Commerce Clause limits 
recognized by the Supreme Court.  See State of Fla., et al., v. H.H.S., et al., No. 10-cv-00091 
(RV) (N.D. Fla.), at 61; Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F.Supp. 882, 893 (Oct. 7, 
2010 E.D. Mich.); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, et al., Mem. Op., Dkt. No. 161, No. 
3:10-cv-00188 (HEH) (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010) at 23-24. 
Because PPACA regulates inactivity, condonation of it causes there to be nothing 
unregulable by the federal government; yet the Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress 
does not possess a general police power.  There is no Commerce Clause precedent that 
reaches inactivity having no effect, let alone a substantial effect, on interstate commerce.  
                                                 
1 Available at, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf.  In October 
2010, CRS updated its report to focus specifically on the PPACA’s Individual Mandate.  See 
Staman & Brougher, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance:  A Constitutional 
Analysis, Cong. Res. Serv., at 9 (October 15, 2010) (attached as Exhibit 3).  In its update, 
CRS again warned:  “whether the individual responsibility requirement would be 
constitutional under the clause is a challenging question, as it is a novel issue whether 
Congress may use the clause to require an individual to purchase a good or a service.”  Id.   
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65.  The enumeration of power in Article I, Section 8 is purposeful, 
premised on the view that only those powers enumerated are possessed by the federal 
government, with those not enumerated being reserved to the states and the people, 
respectively.  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (U.S. 1803).  As a government of 
limited power, the federal government cannot usurp powers not enumerated and regulate 
based upon that usurpation.  Here judicial acceptance of Congress’s novel extension of its 
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause to reach inactivity would create a dangerous 
precedent permitting the federal government to enact any measure that would commandeer 
and direct citizens’ expenditure of their after-tax dollars, circumventing the enumerated 
powers of Congress to tax and spend.  Thus, under such precedent, Congress need not tax or 
spend, but may instead (as it has here) mandate the private purchase of specific goods and 
services to achieve a public interest objective.  The Individual Mandate exceeds Congress’s 
Article I enumerated powers; it regulates inactivity, violating the substantial effects 
Commerce Clause doctrine.  It must be held unconstitutional to avoid the transformation of 
our Republic from one of limited to one of unlimited powers. 
The very concept of an “activity that substantially affects commerce” entails a 
volitional act.  Activity is the sine qua non of the substantial effects doctrine; without it, there 
is nothing to separate what is national and regulable by Congress from what is truly local, and 
not regulable, a distinction the Supreme Court commands be respected in our dual federalist 
system.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65.  The historical use of the word “commerce” further 
suggests that activity is required.  No Supreme Court decision has ever held that the 
Commerce Clause reaches inactivity.  Indeed, if the Commerce Clause could reach that far, it 
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would be impossible “to identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may 
not,” contrary to controlling Commerce Clause precedent.  Id.  
Defendants ask the Court to apply the substantial effects doctrine in error.  Rather than 
apply it to the market before implementation of the Individual Mandate, they ask the Court to 
apply it after that implementation.  By so doing, they create an artifice on which they contend 
that those not insured who pay out of pocket for care will, in the aggregate, impose a burden 
on those insured under the new law.  The defendants’ argument is thus premised on a classic 
fallacy of law and logic: Post hoc ergo propter hoc (“after this, therefore because of this”).  
The Commerce Clause substantial effects doctrine has never been applied by the courts in the 
way the Defendants now apply it; were that so, the doctrine would be robbed of its 
distinguishing principle and would result in a conclusion of substantial effects in every case.  
It may be said of every piece of economic legislation that those resisting its requirements 
burden its operation and, by dint of its economic focus, affect the economy.  Properly 
construed, the substantial effects doctrine focuses not on whether activity has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce after the law in question is effectuated, but whether activity has 
a substantial effect on the market before the law in question is effectuated.  Clearly those 
having no insurance and paying out of pocket for their health care have no substantial effect 
on the pre-PPACA market for health insurance.   
Defendants irrationally argue that citizens without insurance have, by simply existing, 
made a “decision” not to engage in commerce, and that this “decision” supposedly impacts 
the market in the aggregate.  But those citizens in fact have made no decision.  The argument 
is a non-sequitur and by it the government forces all to be regulable without the necessity of  
the government proving that individuals have taken some volitional step that places them in 
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commerce (here, in the insurance market).  The Defendants’ interpretation of economic 
activity to include “inaction” renders the term “activity” meaningless, entirely incapable of 
serving as a distinguishing principle.  Judge Henry Hudson condemned the Defendants’ 
vacuous definition for the key substantial effects doctrine term “activity,” writing: “This 
broad definition of the economic activity subject to congressional regulation lacks logical 
limitation and is unsupported by the Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”  Virginia ex rel. 
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, Dkt. No. 161, at 23. 
 In apparent fear of that result, the Defendants next argue for a free floating Necessary 
and Proper Clause, what our Supreme Court has called “the last, best hope of those who 
defend ultra vires congressional action.”  See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  The Supreme Court has never read the Necessary and Proper Clause 
to be a stand alone alternative to, as opposed to a complement of, the powers expressly 
enumerated in Article I, Section 8.  To the contrary, the Court requires that Congress pass 
laws necessary and proper to effectuate a power expressly enumerated in Section 8.  U.S. v. 
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1971-72 (2010).  The Individual Mandate is not in aid of any 
enumerated power.  It is a form of government coercion over the individual nowhere granted 
Congress by the Constitution.  Supreme Court precedent dictates that where no economic 
activity substantially affects commerce, a law predicated on the Commerce Clause cannot be 
proper and, so, it cannot be supported by the Necessary and Proper Clause.   
The Individual Mandate is an integral part of the statute such that its invalidation 
requires negation of the entire statute.  Without a statement by Congress that the invalidity of 
a portion of a statute is not intended to affect the remainder (i.e., inclusion of a severability 
clause), courts must presume that the legislature intended the act to be effective as an entirety 
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or not at all.  See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 313 (1936) (“[i]n the absence of 
such a provision, the presumption is that the legislature intends an act to be effective as an 
entirety—that is to say, the rule is against the mutilation of a statute; and if any provision be 
unconstitutional, the presumption is that the remaining provisions fall with it”).  The Sixth 
Circuit explains that in determining whether the entire statute or only parts of it are 
unconstitutional, the Court “considers legislative intent, and inquires whether the legislature 
would prefer to have part of the statute remain in force.”  Northland Family Planning Clinic, 
Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 333-34 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Western States Medical Center v. 
Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2001).  
The Defendants have repeatedly stated that the Individual Mandate is inextricably 
intertwined with the PPACA as a whole, taking the position in related cases that the PPACA 
cannot survive without the Individual Mandate.  See, e.g., State of Fla., et al. v. HHS, No. 
3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 55-1), at 45-47 (N.D. Fla.) 
(“Congress found the minimum coverage provisions ‘essential’ to its broader effort to 
regulate health insurance industry practices…”).   
For the reasons explained in detail infra, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court 
hold the Individual Mandate unconstitutional and unenforceable.  The plaintiffs also 
respectfully request that this Honorable Court hold that mandate inextricably intertwined with 
the PPACA as a whole, thus requiring invalidation of the entire statute. 
 
 
Case: 5:10-cv-01065-DDD  Doc #: 69-1  Filed:  01/24/11  12 of 55.  PageID #: 1006
 7
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 On March 21, 2010, the House approved H.R. 3590 (the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act), and on March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the bill into law (Pub. L. 
No. 111-148).  Immediately after the PPACA’s enactment, the House passed H.R. 4872, the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act.  On March 25, 2010, the Senate passed the 
reconciliation provisions.  The final legislation included Section 1501:  “Requirement to 
Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage.”  Section 1501 requires all U.S. citizens to purchase 
private health insurance plans that are certified, i.e., deemed “qualified,” by the federal 
government (hereinafter the “Individual Mandate”).  Failure to do so results in a financial 
penalty, known as the “individual responsibility payment.”  Congress expressly relied on the 
substantial effects doctrine of the Commerce Clause as its constitutional basis for the Individual 
Mandate:  “[t]he individual responsibility requirement provided for in this section … is 
commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce…”  PPACA, 
H.R. 3590, § 1501 (emphasis added).  Congress further explained that “insurance is interstate 
commerce subject to Federal regulation.”  See PPACA § 1501(a)(3).  
 The PPACA was a controversial piece of legislation passed Christmas Eve on a party-line 
vote with few elected representatives having an opportunity to review it.  See, e.g., Statement of 
Mr. John Carter, Proceedings and Debates of the 111st Congress, 2d. Sess., 156 Cong. Rec. 
H2859-01 (Apr. 26, 2010); see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, et al., Mem. Op., Dkt. 
No. 161, No. 3:10-cv-00188 (HEH) (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010) (explaining that Congressional 
intent is hard to determine “given the haste with which the final version of the 2,700 page bill 
was rushed to the floor for a Christmas Eve vote”).   
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The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) warned Congress that the constitutionality of 
the Individual Mandate was in question.  See The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate 
to Buy Health Insurance, CBO Memorandum, at 1-2 (August 1994).2  The CBO explained in 
1994 that such a requirement would be unprecedented;  
A mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance would be an 
unprecedented form of federal action.  The government has never required people 
to buy a good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States.  
An individual mandate would have two features that, in combination, would make 
it unique.  First, it would impose a duty on individuals as members of society.  
Second, it would require people to purchase a specific service that would be 
heavily regulated by the federal government.   
 
Id.  In 2009, the Senate Finance Committee requested that the Congressional Research Service 
“CRS”) address the constitutionality of the Individual Mandate.  CRS did so, concurring with the 
CBO that the Individual Mandate was unprecedented: 
Despite the breadth of powers that have been exercised under the Commerce 
Clause, it is unclear whether the clause would provide a solid constitutional 
foundation for legislation containing a requirement to have health insurance.  
Whether such a requirement would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause 
is perhaps the most challenging question posed by such a proposal, as it is a novel 
issue whether Congress may use this clause to require an individual to purchase a 
good or a service. 
 
See Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance:  A 
Constitutional Analysis, Cong. Res. Serv., at 3 (July 24, 2009).  CRS updated its review in 
October 2010.  There it pointedly and aptly questioned if regulation of the choice to purchase 
health insurance was a regulation of “economic activity” and if requiring the private purchase of 
health insurance by those not insured exceeded Commerce Clause limits.  See Jennifer Staman, 
et al., Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance:  A Constitutional Analysis, Cong. Res. 
Serv., at 9 (October 15, 2010).  CRS wrote: 
                                                 
2 Available at, http://ww.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf (last visited August 
24, 2010). 
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One could argue that while regulation of the health insurance industry or the 
health care system could be considered economic activity, regulating a choice to 
purchase health insurance is not.  It may also be questioned whether a requirement 
to purchase health insurance is really a regulation of an economic activity or 
enterprise, if individuals who would be required to purchase health insurance are 
not, but for this regulation, a part of the health insurance market. 
 
Id. at 11.  As the CRS wisely concluded, “it may seem like too much of a bootstrap to force 
individuals into the health insurance market and then use their participation in that market to say 
they are engaging in commerce…”  Id. at 11-12.  Thus, CRS alerted Congress to the fact that its 
constitutional basis for the Individual Mandate was dubious, revealing that basis to be premised 
on a classic fallacy of law and logic, post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
 If the PPACA Individual Mandate is unconstitutional, then no argument concerning its 
social utility can justify it, as Judge Henry E. Hudson so found.  See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 
Dkt. No. 161, at 21 (“[d]espite the laudable intentions of Congress in enacting a comprehensive 
and transformative health care regime, the legislative process must still operate within 
constitutional bounds”).    
On April 22, 2010, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services published findings 
on the PPACA.  See Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Estimated Financial Effects of the 
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” as Amended (Apr. 22, 2010).3  CMS determined, 
in part, that four million Americans will still be unable to buy a health insurance policy (and will 
be fined $33 billion a year); fourteen million Americans may lose their employer-sponsored 
health insurance as a direct result of the PPACA; twenty-three million Americans will still have 
no health insurance coverage in 2019 after the bill is fully implemented; and twenty-one percent 
of the GDP of the United States will be spent on health care after the law is implemented, which 
                                                 
3 Available at, https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-
22.pdf (attached as Exhibit 4). 
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is higher than if Congress had done nothing.  See Richard S. Foster, supra, Estimate Financial 
Effects of the PPACA, at 6-21; see also Statement of John Carter, 156 Cong. Rec. at H2859 
(summarizing CMS findings).  The PPACA imposes more than $669 billion in new or increased 
taxes over its first 10 years.  See Michael D. Tanner, Bad Medicine:  A Guide to the Real Costs 
and Consequences of the New Health Care Law, Cato Institute (July 12, 2010)4 (citing, Letter 
from Douglas Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to House Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi (March 20, 2010)).5  “The new law also contains other tax related provisions that will add 
significantly to business costs.”  See Tanner, supra, at 21 (explaining that, “[f]or example, the 
legislation requires that businesses provide a 1099 form to every vendor with whom they do 
more than $600 worth of business over the course of a year…  [That] new rule will mean that 
even the smallest businesses will have to issue a form—and file with the IRS—for virtually 
every purchase or payment”).   
 Defendants argue that the Individual Mandate is necessary to avoid “premium spirals.”  
See Def. Memo in Supp. of Mot. to Dism., at 29 (Dkt. No. 28-1).  They argue that without the 
Individual Mandate younger citizens will delay purchasing health insurance until they become 
sick.  Then, once sick, they will not pay out of pocket for their care but will receive health 
insurance because, the Defendants argue, the PPACA guarantees the provision of care without 
regard to preexisting conditions.  Because the insurer’s risk pool would then include a greater 
percentage of sick individuals, the insurer must raise premiums to remain profitable.  As 
premiums increase, more individuals would choose to forgo insurance until they contract an 
illness or require medical care.  The Individual Mandate, according to Defendants, thus prevents 
                                                 
4 Available at, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11961 (attached as Exhibit 
5). 
5 Available at, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf (attached as 
Exhibit 6). 
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the premium spiral by forcing younger healthy individuals to participate in the market, providing 
insurers with premiums from the low-risk population and offsetting the cost of high-risk 
members.  The Defendants’ theory thus begs the ultimate question.  By it, the PPACA forces 
younger healthy individuals to enter the insurance market.  The Defendants thus argue that 
uninsured individuals have a substantial effect on interstate commerce because they increase the 
cost of insurance by burdening the very system the PPACA creates.  The argument depends on a 
misapplication of the substantial effects doctrine, applying it not to the pre-regulated market but 
to the regulated market the PPACA creates.  It thus guts the doctrine, because it may be said of 
every piece of economic legislation that those resisting its requirements burden its operation and, 
by dint of its economic focus, affect the economy.  Never has the doctrine been applied in that 
way; it always focuses on the market ex-ante, not ex-post.  The focus is not on whether activity 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce after the law in question is effectuated, but 
whether the activity has a substantial effect on the market to be regulated before the law in 
question is effectuated.  Clearly those having no insurance and paying out of pocket for their 
health care have no substantial effect on the market for health insurance before the PPACA 
comes into effect.   
 In 2014, if an individual lacks creditable coverage, the PPACA imposes an annual 
penalty:  $695 per family member, up to a maximum of $2,085 per family.  See PPACA §§ 1501, 
1502.  Employers may be penalized annually between $2,000 and $3,000 per worker.  See 
PPACA §§ 1511, 1513.  Some analysts predict that the cost of qualifying health insurance 
coverage could be approximately $15,000 per year by 2016.  See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of 
the American Civil Rights Union in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 9 
(Dkt. No. 127), State of Fla., et al., v. HHS, No. 10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (citing John 
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Goodman, Four Trojan Horses, Health Alert, National Center for Policy Analysis, April 15, 
2010).  Thus, paying the PPACA Mandate penalty may still be far less expensive than 
purchasing qualifying insurance, and the decision to wait could make financial sense because, if 
a citizen later becomes sick, a guaranteed insurance policy awaits.   
 After adopting a very similar system in Massachusetts in 2006, the state experienced 
these very problems.  See id. at 10-11; Michael Tanner, supra page 14, at 1 (explaining that, 
since 2006, health care costs in Massachusetts continue to rise “much faster than the national 
average”).  In Massachusetts, “total state health care spending has increased by 28 percent.  
Insurance premiums have increased by 8-10 percent per year, nearly double the national 
average.”  Id. at 1; see also Grace Marie Turner, “The Failure of RomneyCare,” The Wall Street 
Journal, March 17, 2010 (“insurance companies are required to sell ‘just-in-time’ policies even if 
people wait until they are sick to buy coverage.  That’s just like the [PPACA].  There is growing 
evidence that many people are gaming the system by purchasing health insurance when they 
need surgery or other expensive medical care, then dropping it a few months later”).6  
The individual plaintiffs do not have health insurance and do not want it.  See Grapek 
Affidavit, at ¶ 6 (attached as Exhibit 1); Thompson Affidavit, at ¶ 6 (attached as Exhibit 2).  
They pay out of pocket for care from physicians who do not require insurance, and they intend to 
continue paying out of pocket in future, including for any catastrophic care they may require.  
See Grapek Affidavit, at ¶ 6; Thompson Affidavit, at ¶ 6.  They are not within the class defined 
by Congress as imposing a burden on the health care system.  See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS (2008) (hereinafter, 
                                                 
6 Available at, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703625304575115691871093652.html (last 
visited December 22, 2010). 
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“CBO KEY ISSUES”), at 11, 27 (attached as Exhibit 9).  The plaintiffs do not want to contract for 
insurance that will cover medical services because they want their physicians to exercise 
independent professional judgment (providing plaintiffs the level and quality of care those 
physicians think best without regard to insurance reimbursement).  See Grapek Affidavit, at ¶¶ 
10-11; Thompson Affidavit, at ¶ 10.  They do not want to be associated with health insurers.  
They do not want to divulge their health status to any health insurer.  Although Congress 
included several exemptions to the Individual Mandate,7 none applies to the individually named 
plaintiffs.8  See Grapek Affidavit, at ¶¶ 1-6; Thompson Affidavit at ¶¶ 1-6.   
The Individual Mandate has been challenged in federal courts across the country and, in 
particular, in federal District Courts in Florida, Virginia, California, and Michigan.  See State of 
Fla., et al., v. H.H.S., et al., No. 10-cv-00091 (RV) (N.D. Fla.); Commonwealth of Virginia ex 
rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, et al., No. 10-cv-00188 (HEH) (E.D. Va.); Liberty University, Inc., et 
al., v. Geithner, No. 10-cv-00015 (NKM) (W.D. Va.); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-
cv-11156 (E.D. Mich.); Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10-cv-1033 (S.D. Cal.).  
In Virginia ex rel Cuccinelli, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment on December 13, 2010, holding the PPACA’s Individual Mandate unconstitutional 
                                                 
7 See PPACA § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (religious exemption); PPACA § 5000A(d)(2)(B) 
(Healthcare ministry exemption); PPACA § 5000A(d)(2)(C) & (D) (incarceration exemption); 
PPACA § 5000A(e)(1)(A) & (B) (contribution exemption); PPACA § 5000A(e)(2) (poverty 
exemption); PPACA § 5000A(e)(5) (hardship exemption); PPACA § 5000A(e)(3) (native 
American exemption).   
8 Plaintiffs do not declare religious conscience exemptions (PPACA § 5000A(d)(2)(A)); 
they do not participate in a health care sharing ministry (PPACA § 5000A(d)(2)(B)); they are 
United States citizens not presently incarcerated (PPACA § 5000A(d)(2)(C) & (D)); their 
required contributions under PPACA are under 8 percent of their household incomes (PPACA § 
5000A(e)(1)(A) & (B)); each individually named plaintiffs’ income is greater than 400 percent 
of the poverty line (PPACA § 5000A(e)(2)); they are not members of Indian tribes (PPACA § 
5000A(e)(3)); and they claim no hardship concerning their ability to obtain coverage under a 
qualified plan (PPACA § 5000A(e)(5)).   
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under the Commerce Clause.  See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, Dkt. No. 161, Memorandum 
Opinion.  The Court explained that regulation under the Commerce, and correlative Necessary 
and Proper, Clauses depend on proof of activity affecting interstate commerce and has never 
been condoned predicated on an involuntary entry into commerce such as that argued by the 
Defendants.  Id. at 24.  “Neither the Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court of appeals has 
extended Commerce Clause powers to compel an individual to involuntarily enter the stream of 
commerce by purchasing a commodity in the private market.”  Id. at 24.  According to the 
Defendants’ argument, the Commerce Clause must permit every conceivable economic 
regulation by the federal government because it is always the case that the failure of an 
individual to take an economic action under the government’s regulation necessary affects the 
regulated market.  “The unchecked expansion of congressional power to the limits suggested by 
the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision,” said Judge Hudson, “would invite unbridled 
exercise of federal police powers.”  Id. at 37.  Judge Hudson thus found the Individual Mandate, 
PPACA Section 1501, unconstitutional and severed it from the statute, leaving the remainder of 
the law intact.  Judge Hudson did not issue an injunction barring the Defendants from continuing 
to enforce the remaining portions of the PPACA.  See id. at 41 (explaining that the Defendants 
are “duty-bound to honor this Court’s declaratory judgment” and, thus, “there is no need for 
injunctive relief”).   
In Florida, District Court Judge Roger Vinson denied in part and granted in part the 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss on October 14, 2010.  See State of Fla., Dkt. No. 79 (Order and 
Memorandum Opinion).  In so ruling, the Court stated that the PPACA appeared presumptively 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 64.  That Court has since heard oral arguments on December 16, 2010 on 
cross-motions for summary judgment. 
Case: 5:10-cv-01065-DDD  Doc #: 69-1  Filed:  01/24/11  20 of 55.  PageID #: 1014
 15
In Liberty University, the District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.  See Liberty University, Inc., No. 10-cv-00015 (W.D. Va.) (Dkt. 
No. 45).  Judge Norman K. Moon concluded contrary to Judge Hudson, and we think in error, 
that the PPACA’s Individual Mandate fell within Congress’s power to regulate commerce.  Id. at 
21-29. 
In Thomas More Law Ctr., the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss.  See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-cv-11156 
(E.D. Mich.) (Dkt. No. 28).  Judge George Caram Steeh held, contrary to Judge Hudson, and we 
think in error, that the Individual Mandate did not exceed Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause.  Plaintiffs have appealed the order to the Sixth Circuit.  See Thomas More 
Law Center, et al., v. Barack Obama, et al., No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. 2010).  Appellant’s opening 
brief was filed on December 15, 2010.  The pleading cycle ends on January 31.  Id. (Doc. No. 
006110780166, setting briefing schedule). 
Finally, in Baldwin, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their challenge. 
There, unlike here, Plaintiffs pled no injury for Article III standing purposes.  See Baldwin v. 
Sebelius, No. 10-cv-1033 (S.D. Cal.) (Dkt. No. 37).  The Baldwin Plaintiffs have appealed the 
decision to the Ninth Circuit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322-23 (1986).  Summary Judgment “shall be rendered … if the pleadings … together with 
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the affidavits … show there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  See Averill v. Gleaner Life Ins. Soc., 626 F.Supp. 2d 
756, 761 (N.D. Ohio 2009).  “The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment 
does not differ from the standard when one party files such a motion.”  Id.   
 
II. CONGRESS POSSESSES NO ARTICLE I POWER TO COMPEL THE 
PURCHASE OF A PRIVATE PRODUCT 
 
Under Article I Congress may impose taxes to raise revenue and may expend that 
revenue for enumerated purposes, but nowhere in Article I is Congress given the power to 
compel Americans to purchase specific private products with their after-tax dollars.  The PPACA 
compels individuals to purchase “qualified” health insurance plans to achieve the legislative goal 
of near universal health insurance.  From 1787 until 2009, Congress never passed a single bill 
compelling American citizens to purchase a private good or service.  See Jennifer Staman & 
Cynthia Brougher, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance:  A Constitutional 
Analysis, Cong. Res. Serv., at 3 (July 24, 2009).9  Article I gives Congress no such power.  To 
the contrary, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution creates a government of limited, specifically 
enumerated powers, granting those expressly included and presumptively excluding those not.  
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 
(1995) (“the Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers”); Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803) (the federal government is based on the premise that the 
“powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or 
forgotten, the constitution is written”).  It is the purpose of a written Constitution to define 
                                                 
9 Available at, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf (Exhibit 3). See also 
Staman & Brougher, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance:  A Constitutional 
Analysis, Cong. Res. Serv., at 9 (October 15, 2010).    
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government so as to prevent the exercise of congressional powers beyond those enumerated in 
the text.  As James Madison put it: “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
federal government are few and defined.”  James Madison, Federalist No. 45, The Federalist 
Papers (quoted in part in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2229 (2005)).  “The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, 
improvement, and prosperity of the State.” Id.; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) 
(the system of dual sovereignty “was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our 
fundamental liberties”).   
Early in the Republic, George Washington warned against “usurpations of power” by 
Congress akin to the one effected by the Individual Mandate.  In his 1796 Farewell Address, 
President Washington warned, “let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one 
instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments 
are destroyed.”  35 Writings of George Washington (Fitzpatrick ed. 1940).  By virtue of the 
Constitution’s enumerated powers in Article I, the states were protected as repositories of general 
police powers.  “Just as the separation and independence of coordinate branches of the Federal 
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy 
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny 
and abuse from either . . .”  Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)); The 
Federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“[i]n the compound republic of 
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, 
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence 
a double security arises to the rights of the people.  The different governments will control each 
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other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself”); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments 
for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:  Rather, federalism 
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power”).  
The American republic is defined by its creation and preservation of a federal 
government of limited powers.  See James Madison, Federalist No. 45, in Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison & John Jay, The Federalist Papers 277, 289 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 
1961).  In Federalist No. 45, James Madison explained: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are 
numerous and indefinite.  The former will be exercised principally on external 
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the 
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected.  The powers reserved to 
the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. 
 
Id.  In Lopez and Morrison, the Rehnquist Court reaffirmed that a limited federal government is 
essential to preserving our repulic.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  “Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one 
or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.  Since the 
New Deal, Congress has enacted legislation to the limits of its Commerce Clause power, 
ultimately reaching a zenith in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 243 (2006).  But even the Raich 
Court recoiled from a judgment that would grant Congress power to regulate an American citizen 
in a state of repose who takes no action affecting interstate commerce.  Commerce Clause 
regulation has limits and construing it otherwise defeats its purpose.  As Chief Justice John 
Marshall put it:  
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To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation 
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended 
to be restrained?  The distinction between a government with limited and 
unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the person on whom 
they are imposed. 
 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (U.S. 1803).  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“[w]e enforce the ‘outer limits’ of Congress' Commerce Clause authority not for 
their own sake, but to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal 
encroachment and thereby to maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist 
system of government”).   
Congressional action to compel private purchases with after tax dollars is an 
unprecedented expansion of federal power beyond the enumerations in Article I.  It circumvents 
Article I, Section 8 taxing and spending authority; it invades powers reserved to the people and 
the states in the 9th and 10th Amendments, respectively; and it undermines further the Fifth 
Amendment’s takings clause (enabling in certain instances Congress to avoid payment of just 
compensation for a taking by simply eliminating a competing market for a product through 
government command that consumers purchase one offering to the exclusion of others).   
Moreover, it sets upon its head the primary purpose of the Commerce Clause, which is to 
give Congress the power to regulate commerce so as to eliminate protectionist state barriers that 
encumber free economic interchange among the states.  See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 
Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976) (“the very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to 
create an area of free trade among the several States” and to create “an area of trade free from 
interference by the States”); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 453 n.5 (1980); International 
Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 644-45 (6th Cir. 2010).  To the opposite end, the 
PPACA erects a national protectionist barrier for the insurance industry, transforming insurance 
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companies that offer federally qualified plans into economic Leviathans with legally obliged 
customers at the expense of those, such as the individual named Plaintiffs, who—left free to 
choose—would not purchase private insurance and have paid (and would continue to pay) out of 
pocket for health care expenses as they arise.  See Grapek Affidavit, at ¶¶ 6-7; Thompson 
Affidavit, at ¶¶ 6-8. 
Section 8 of Article I defines the means by which Congress may constitutionally finance 
the legislation it enacts.  Congress may lay and collect taxes and may pay debts to finance its 
legislation.  Article I gives Congress no power to reach beyond government coffers and force 
American citizens to pay for specific private goods or services to fulfill legislated objectives.  By 
compelling Americans to buy federally qualified health insurance plans, the PPACA’s individual 
mandate creates an entirely new extra-constitutional funding mechanism, one that circumvents 
the constitutional means of taxing and spending and for the first time makes each American 
citizen responsible for financing legislative objectives with his or her own after tax dollars.  That 
action not only exceeds the powers delegated Congress in Article I, it also conflicts with the 
basic constitutional design, which defines a government of limited powers.  It does so by 
rendering Congress possessed of unlimited power to direct how Americans expend their after tax 
income.   
If the Defendants’ position is embraced, there will be no legal distinguishing principle 
that could prevent Congress from financing an ever increasing array of legislative objectives by 
coercing Americans to expend ever more of their after-tax dollars on specific private goods or 
services preferred by the government.  The effect is one of progressive enslavement, causing 
individuals previously free to choose how best to expend their after tax dollars to become mere 
instruments of the federal government, legally compelled to make specific purchases of private 
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goods and services to fulfill federal legislative master plans.  If Congress may coerce and compel 
Americans into buying private health insurance against their will because Congress thinks health 
insurance a wise purchase, what then prevents Congress from compelling Americans to buy 
other private products or services it thinks wise for all?  Congress could deem air pollution from 
the burning of carbon based fuels unacceptable; rather than set limits on emissions, it could order 
every American adult to buy an electric car.  Congress could deem the American diet deleterious 
to health and burdensome to public health resources; rather than ban or tax unhealthful food, it 
could order every American to buy each month a certain amount of fruits and vegetables for 
federally qualified vendors.  Congress could deem American dependence on foreign oil 
excessive and, rather than purchase oil for a national reserve or give tax credits or subsidies for 
domestic fuel production or oil alternatives, it could order every American to pay a certain 
amount per month for domestically manufactured fuel and oil alternatives.  There is no 
principled limit to the extension of legislative power if Congress is permitted to reach beyond its 
Article I enumerated powers and directly compel Americans to buy specific private goods and 
services with their after-tax dollars.  All after-tax dollars may thus be mandated for specific 
private purchases by various Acts of Congress, destroying freedom of choice and rendering the 
individual a mere functionary of the federal government.  
 Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides Congress with power to 
“regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”  That grant of power permits regulation of “activities having a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce.”  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the substantial effects doctrine may be abused.  A liberal 
interpretation of it has the potential to eviscerate the enumerated limits in Article I, Section 8.  
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See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65.  The Supreme Court thus expects the lower federal courts to 
police congressional actions under the doctrine and disallow those where invocation of the 
doctrine would defeat the doctrine’s purpose of preventing the federal government from 
regulating without limit.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65 (“[u]nder the theories that the 
Government presents in support … it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power”).  
By compelling all citizens to purchase health insurance, Congress has overstepped its 
bounds, causing the substantial effects doctrine to be so liberally construed as to render that 
which is truly local to be regulable nationally.  PPACA’s Individual Mandate is not restricted to 
those presently engaged in interstate commerce, i.e., those who have health insurance or are 
desirous of obtaining it.  Instead, the Mandate applies to all presently uninsured (subject to a few 
narrow exemptions).  The Individual Mandate compels the individual named plaintiffs (who 
have no health insurance and desire none and who, thus, have no substantial effect on the market 
for health insurance) to enter the insurance market and become regulable.  If those not in 
commerce can be compelled to enter it in order to be regulable, then nothing remains beyond the 
reach of the Commerce Clause.  Congress may forever coerce every individual to leave his or her 
state of repose, enter commerce, and become regulable.  
 
III. INACTIVITY HAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE 
 
The term “commerce” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 means economic interchange and  
requires private action.  There is no precedent supporting the Defendants’ notion that inactivity 
in the aggregate constitutes activity within the meaning of either the word “commerce” or the 
substantial effects doctrine. 
A. The  Word “Commerce”  Means Economic Interchange, i.e., Activity 
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“A law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause may validly be applied to the extent 
that that law reaches activity that is within the Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.  
However, a law loses its validity if applied in such a way as to extend its reach beyond the 
original grant of authority under the Commerce Clause.”  Michigan Protection and Advocacy 
Service, Inc. v. Babin, 799 F.Supp. 695, 731 (E.D. Mich. 1992). 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress authority “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  As 
known to the Founding Fathers, the word “commerce” encompassed “intercourse; exchange of 
one thing for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick.”  S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the 
English Language (J.F. Rivington, et al. 6th ed. 1785); see also N. Baily, Dictionarium 
Britannicum or a more complete Universal Etymological English Dictionary than any Extant 
(London 1730) (“trade or traffick in buying or selling”).  In 1828 commerce was defined further as 
“an interchange or mutual change of goods, wares, productions, or property of any kind, between 
nations or individuals, either by barter, or by purchase and sale; trade; traffick.”  Noah Webster, An 
American Dictionary of the English Language at 42 (S. Converse New York 1828).  In each 
definition the meaning depends on voluntary action.  Activity is at the core of the term “commerce.”  
The historical terms used to define “commerce” have been recognized in the law.  In Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824), the Court stated plainly that “[c]ommerce, undoubtedly 
is traffic, but it is something more:  it is intercourse.  It describes the commercial intercourse between 
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on 
that intercourse.”  Id. “Commerce” must be given substance, requiring the active and voluntary 
involvement of an individual to fall within its legal meaning.  “Commerce” must not be expanded to 
encompass inactivity, to reach one in a state of repose, or everything becomes federally regulable and 
the clause loses its limits.   
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Defendants’ arguments seeking to expand the definition of “commerce” to include inactivity 
contradict the historical intent and meaning of the term as interpreted by the Supreme Court. See 
Lopez, 514 U .S. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., Concurring) (“[a]t the time the original Constitution was 
ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these 
purposes…  ‘[C]ommerce’ was used in contradistinction to productive activities such as 
manufacturing and agriculture”).  An individual’s inactivity cannot be presumed commercial activity 
and, thus, be used by Congress as a basis to legislate under the Commerce Clause without destroying 
the intent and meaning of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8.  Id. at 587 
(“injecting a modern sense of commerce into the Constitution generates significant textual and 
structural problems”). 
  
B. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Does Not Support the Regulation of 
Inactivity 
 
Congress may regulate three aspects of “commerce” under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 
under Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).  
Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce.  Id.  Congress has the authority to 
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in 
interstate commerce.  Id. Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.  Id.  In the PPACA, Congress cites only to the third category as the basis 
for the Individual Mandate.  See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, No. 10-188 (E.D. Va.), Dkt. No. 
161, at 11.  See PPACA Section 1501(a)(1) (“[t]he individual responsibility requirement 
provided for in this section …is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects 
interstate commerce…”).   
The Supreme Court limits Commerce Clause regulation to those “activities” that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.  See, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S. at 150; Virginia ex rel. 
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Cuccinelli, Dkt. No. 161, at 23 (Commerce Clause regulation “must involve activity” to survive 
a constitutional challenge).  Invocation of the Commerce Clause substantial effects doctrine thus 
requires two essential elements:  (1) an activity that (2) substantially affects interstate commerce.  
Without a regulable “economic activity,” the Commerce Clause cannot be invoked as a basis for 
regulation.   
A person who does not have health insurance, pays out of pocket for his medical care, 
and does not intend to buy health insurance in the future is not engaged in economic activity 
constitutionally regulable under the PPACA.  “It is a virtual state of repose—or idleness—the 
converse of activity.”  See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 2010 WL 2991385, at *11 (summarizing 
Commonwealth’s argument); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, No. 10-188 (E.D. Va.), Dkt. No. 161, at 
24 (“an individual’s personal decision to purchase—or decline to purchase—health insurance 
from a private provider is beyond the historical reach of the Commerce Clause”).   
The Defendants endeavor to convince this Court that a state of repose (of not being in the 
market for health insurance) extant before the passage of the law is not the determining factor.  
Rather, the Defendants urge this Court to examine the uninsured person after the law’s passage 
and to determine whether at that time there is a “substantial effect” on the regulated market for 
insurance.  That ex post analysis is incorrect and, if accepted, would gut the substantial effects 
doctrine.  The argument is premised on the classic fallacy of law and logic: Post hoc ergo propter 
hoc (“after this, therefore because of this”).  It may be said of every piece of economic 
legislation that those resisting its requirements burden its operation and, by dint of its economic 
focus, affect the economy, at least if one considers the aggregate effect.  Never has the doctrine 
been applied in that way, as the Defendants now urge upon this Court.  The focus is not on 
whether activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce after the law in question is 
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effectuated, but whether the activity has a substantial effect on the market before the law in 
question is effectuated.  Clearly those having no insurance and paying out of pocket for their 
health care have no substantial effect on the market for health insurance before the law in 
question comes into effect.    
The Defendants would have this Court read the Commerce Clause to have no limit, to 
reach all without regard to their inactive status.  They do so on a fiction that defines mere 
inactivity, mere existence, as a volitional “decision” not to purchase health insurance.  They rely 
on a “remote chain of inferences” and assume that simply existing, without more, is a decisive 
act.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (“[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would 
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the 
States”).   
District Court Judge Roger Vinson well understood and rejected the Defendants’ 
underlying argument:  “Their argument on this point can be broken down to the following 
syllogism:  (1) because the majority of people will at some point in their lives need and consume 
healthcare services, and (2) because some of the people are unwilling or unable to pay for those 
services, (3) Congress may regulate everyone and require that everyone have specific, federally-
approved insurance.”  State of Fla., et al., 716 F.Supp. 2d at 1162; Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 
No. 10-188 (E.D. Va.), Dkt. No. 161, at 6 n.2 (quoting Judge Vinson).  In response to that 
identical argument (which Defendants also make here), District Court Judge Henry E. Hudson 
explained that Congress’s ability to regulate under its Commerce Clause authority could not be 
transmogrified to reach presumed action as the Defendants would have it but, instead, must begin 
with “activity.”  See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, Dkt. No. 161, at 23-24:   
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In surveying the legal landscape, several operative elements are commonly 
encountered in Commerce Clause Decisions.  First, to survive a constitutional 
challenge the subject matter must be economic in nature and affect interstate 
commerce, and second, it must involve activity.  Every application of Commerce 
Clause power found to be constitutionally sound by the Supreme Court involved 
some form of action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an individual or 
legal entity. 
 
Judge Vinson then held that Congress’s Commerce Clause “regulatory powers are triggered by 
some type of self-initiated action.”  Id. at 24 (holding that “[n]either the Supreme Court nor any 
federal circuit court of appeals has extended the Commerce Clause powers to compel an 
individual to involuntarily enter the stream of commerce by purchasing a commodity in the 
private market,” and that “the collective effect of an aggregate of such inactivity still falls short 
of the constitutional mark”). 
As Judge Hudson recognized, the Defendants’ focus on the impact of the uninsured on 
the insurance market created by the law’s implementation is an erroneous construct (one in 
which the individual is involuntarily entered into the stream of commerce) and the Defendants’ 
chain of inferences (their aggregation of inactivity until it reaches some hypothetical level said to 
be activity) completely nullifies any limits the Commerce Clause imposes on the federal 
Government.  If the Commerce Clause will permit regulation of anyone whose failure to take 
action affects a market regulated by an Act of Congress then no one is beyond the reach of 
Congress’s regulatory power and everything local becomes regulable nationally.   
The Defendants offer no explanation of what limits the Commerce Clause retains if the 
Court accepts Defendants’ argument, if Congress may regulate inactivity on the premise that it 
affects a regulated market created by the very legislation in issue.  Under PPACA, all private 
purchasing decisions—negative and affirmative—are characterized under the Defendants’ theory 
as commercial and economic activity.  Thus the Defendants’ argument embraces a circumstance 
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feared by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lopez.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (observing that without 
“real limits . . . any activity can be looked upon as commercial”).  PPACA’s Individual Mandate 
has imposed a condition on U.S. citizenship.  By simply existing a citizen must purchase health 
insurance.  There is in this no limit to the reach of the Commerce Clause. 
 
C. Congress’s Novel Application of Its Commerce Clause Authority Is 
Presumptively Unconstitutional 
 
In 1994, the CBO recognized that “an individual mandate would be unprecedented.”  See 
CBO Memorandum, at 1-2 (Aug. 1994).10  The CBO stated that:  “A mandate requiring all 
individuals to purchase health insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal action.  The 
government has never required people to buy a good or service as a condition of lawful residence 
in the United States.”  Id.  In July 2009 the CRS alerted Congress to the novelty of its position, 
warning: 
Despite the breadth of powers that have been exercised under the Commerce 
Clause, it is unclear whether the clause would provide a solid constitutional 
foundation for legislation containing a requirement to have health insurance.  
Whether such a requirement would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause 
is perhaps the most challenging question posed by such a proposal, as it is a novel 
issue whether Congress may use this clause to require an individual to purchase a 
good or a service. 
 
See Staman & Brougher, Cong. Res. Serv., at 3 (July 24, 2009).11  CRS seized upon the very 
temporal error (applying the substantial effects doctrine not to the market ex-ante but to the 
regulated market ex-post) that the Defendants engage in now:  “It may also be questioned 
whether a requirement to purchase health insurance is really a regulation of an economic activity 
or enterprise, if individuals who would be required to purchase health insurance are not, but for 
                                                 
10 Available at, http://ww.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf (Exhibit 7).  
11 Available at, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf (Exhibit 3). 
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this regulation, a part of the health insurance market.”  Id. at 6.  In October 2010, CRS updated 
its report to focus specifically on the PPACA’s Individual Mandate.  See Staman & Brougher, 
Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance:  A Constitutional Analysis, Cong. Res. Serv., 
at 9 (October 15, 2010).  CRS could not find Congress’s new application of the Commerce 
Clause constitutional:  “whether the individual responsibility requirement would be 
constitutional under the clause is a challenging question, as it is a novel issue whether Congress 
may use the clause to require an individual to purchase a good or a service.”  Id.   
Indeed, three separate courts have now found that the PPACA ventures into uncharted 
waters under the Commerce Clause.  See State of Fla., et al., at 61 (“[t]he power that the 
individual mandate seeks to harness is simply without prior precedent”); Thomas More, at 15 
(“[t]he [Supreme] Court has never needed to address the activity/inactivity distinction advanced 
by plaintiffs because in every Commerce Clause case presented thus far, there has been some 
sort of activity.  In this regard, the [PPACA] arguably presents an issue of first impression”); 
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, Dkt. No. 161, at 23-24 (“the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision 
exceeds the Commerce Clause powers vested in Congress under Article I”). 
 A summary review of all major Supreme Court decisions involving the Commerce 
Clause since Gibbons reveals one common element not present here:  a volitional act.  See 
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, Dkt. No. 161, at 24 (holding that Congress’s regulatory power under 
the Commerce Clause, or correlative Necessary and Proper Clause powers, “are triggered by 
some type of self-initiated action”).  In Gibbons, the Court analyzed the grant of exclusive 
navigation rights to Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton.  See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).  The 
decision to provide navigation rights for a term of years was an affirmative act.  In Swift, the 
defendants were engaged in the business of buying livestock at Chicago stockyards and 
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slaughtering same at respective plants in different states.  See Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375, 
390 (1905).  In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court examined the constitutionality of the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which prohibited employers from engaging in unfair labor 
practices, including dismissing employees for union activity.  See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937).  Darby concerned the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 
which rendered illegal the employment of workers in the production of goods intended for 
interstate commerce at other than prescribed hours or wages.  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100, 125 (1941).  The act of employing workers for the production of goods is, unquestionably, 
an affirmative action.  Wickard involved the production of wheat for home consumption.  See 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach, the 
Commerce Clause’s civil rights cases, both involved voluntary action, to wit, intentional 
discrimination.  See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 350-51 (1964) 
(hotel had in place a “practice of refusing to rent rooms” to blacks); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294, 296-97 (1964) (barbecue restaurant catered to white-only customers).  Perez concerned 
loan-sharking activities.  Perez v. U .S., 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (involving loan-shark activity 
among organized crime syndicates).  Lopez concerned the act of carrying a handgun in a school 
zone.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52.  Morrison addressed the crime of rape.  
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602-03 (2000).  The Court in Raich addressed the 
cultivation of personal-use marijuana.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2005).   
 The Supreme Court in Printz addressed whether the Brady Act unconstitutionally 
commandeered state officers to execute federal laws.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
905 (1977).  The Court explained that the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers can be judged 
by historical use.  Id.  In Printz, the Court stated that “if … earlier Congresses avoided use of this 
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highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to 
exist.”  Id. at 905.  As in this case, the Brady Act at issue in Printz imposed obligations that were 
largely unprecedented.  The Court found few relevant statutes in American legal history that 
imposed obligations similar to those placed on State executives through the Brady Act.  Id. at 
907-08.  Accordingly, the “utter lack of [authority] imposing obligations on the States’ 
executives (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), suggests an assumed 
absence of such power.”  Id. (emphasis original).  The shear lack of Congress’s invocation of a 
presumed power, the “almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice,” 
“negat[ed] the existence of a congressional power” in the Printz case.  Id. at 918.  As in Printz, 
so too here, the Defendants lack of a historical use of power to compel American citizens to 
make a purchase of a private good or service makes the present use presumptively 
unconstitutional, as the State of Fla. Court reasoned:  “[w]hile the novel and unprecedented 
nature of the individual mandate does not automatically render it unconstitutional, there is 
perhaps a presumption that it is.”  State of Fla., et al., No. 10-91 Dkt. No. 79 (N.D. Fla.), at 64.  
In the absence of any apposite authority expanding the Commerce Clause to reach inactivity, the 
Defendants’ position is presumptively unconstitutional. 
 Judge Vinson in State of Fla., et al., recognized the import of the Printz decision in 
passing on the Individual Mandate, explaining: 
Starting in the First World War, there have been at least six attempts by the 
federal government to introduce some kind of universal healthcare insurance 
coverage.  At no point—until now—did it mandate that everyone buy insurance…  
In Printz, the Supreme Court stated several times that an “absence of power” to 
do something could be inferred because Congress had never made an attempt to 
exercise that power before. 
 
State of Fla., et al., at 64 (emphasis original).  Indeed, if Congress could compel the purchase of 
private goods or services through its Commerce Clause power, or derivative Necessary and 
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Proper power, one would expect to find at least one such example; but, alas, there is none.  See 
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:  Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate 
Is Unconstitutional, N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty (Forthcoming, 2011), at 21 (“consider this:  had the 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses been used to mandate individual conduct, every 
citizen would be able to recite all the mandates to which he or she must adhere upon penalty of a 
fine.  Yet, apart from registering for the draft, serving on a jury, submitting a tax return, and 
responding to the census, none of us can think of any such personal mandates”).   
Heretofore in no instance has Congress presumed to regulate inactivity (and with good 
reason).  If inactivity is regulable, there is no limit to the reach of the Commerce Clause; all that 
which is local becomes national (federally regulable).  If inaction is the same as action, there is 
no distinguishing principle to determine what is and is not “in commerce;” rather, mere existence 
suffices and, thus, all is in commerce.  To uphold the PPACA’s Individual Mandate, the Court 
must embrace a non-sequitur.  It must hold inaction to be the equivalent of action that 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  It must hold the decision not to buy private health 
insurance to be an involvement with commerce in health insurance.  The argument proceeds on 
an assumption of power no less expansive than the straight forward argument that the commerce 
clause reaches all regardless of lack of involvement in any matter of commerce.  That argument 
requires acceptance of a limitless federal power, something our Supreme Court has never 
accepted.   
The Defendants attempt to forge new ground for the Commerce Clause by analogizing 
regulation under PPACA with Raich and Wickard.  The cases are inapposite.  Both Raich and 
Wickard involved the production of commodities for personal use.  Activity existed in Wickard.  
Roscoe Filburn actually sold a portion of his crop.  See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114 (“[i]t has been 
Case: 5:10-cv-01065-DDD  Doc #: 69-1  Filed:  01/24/11  38 of 55.  PageID #: 1032
 33
his practice to raise a small acreage of winter wheat, sown in the Fall and harvested in the 
following July; to sell a portion of his crop; to feed part of his poultry…”); Raich, 545 U.S. at 7-
8.  Raich focused on the Controlled Substances Act.  The purpose of the legislation was to 
“control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 12.  
The activity and commodities (drugs) that were regulated under the CSA were clearly within the 
scope of interstate commerce, either legitimate or illegitimate.  As in Wickard, the Raich Court 
found that the production or cultivation of a commodity could be regulated even if such 
production occurs purely intrastate and total consumption of the product was for personal use.  
Id. at 25-26.  Raich centered on the nature of the targeted activity (the growing of marijuana for 
personal use).  Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-26 (“respondents are cultivating for home consumption, a 
fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market”).  The 
respondent claimed that marijuana grown locally for personal use was purely intrastate and 
unconnected to interstate commerce.  Id. at 6-7.  Distinguishing Lopez and Morrison for their 
criminal nature, the Raich Court observed that “when Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ 
of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Id. at 17.  The 
market in issue was that extant before regulation. The Court remained focused on the presence of 
activity.  The growing of the marijuana for sale was an economic activity, and “[w]here 
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity 
will be sustained.”  Id. at 25 (emphasis added).  
Raich is inapposite to PPACA’s Individual Mandate because Raich involved activity (the 
growing of marijuana for sale).  In Lopez, the Supreme Court explained that “the scope of the 
interstate commerce power must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and 
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote 
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that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction 
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.”  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).   
 Lopez involved the regulation of guns under the Gun-Free School Zones Act.  Id. at 551-
52.  Like the PPACA’s Individual Mandate, Congress relied on the third justificatory rationale 
for application of the Commerce Clause:  that Congress may regulate activities having a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.  See id. at 558-59.  The Gun-Free School Zones Act 
criminalized the possession of a firearm within proximity of school zones.  Id. at 551-52.  Thus, 
unlike PPACA’s Section 1501, Lopez also involved an act, the carrying of a firearm.  The simple 
act of possessing a firearm, however, has nothing to do with interstate commerce.  Id. at 563-64.  
Nonetheless, the Government defended its legislation in an argument similar to its PPACA 
defense, by citing the costs of violent crime, in the aggregate, on the rest of the country.  Id.  In 
particular, the “Government argue[d] that possession of a firearm in a school zone may result in 
violent crime and that violent crime can be expected to affect the functioning of the national 
economy” because “the costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the mechanisms of 
insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population.”  Id.  (emphasis added).  That 
tenuous tie to commerce is markedly similar to the Defendants argument in this case whereby it 
recites the burdens on the PPACA regualted health care industry caused by citizens that have 
performed no volitional act.   
 The Lopez Court held that, “[u]nder the theories that the Government presents in support 
of [the Gun-Free School Zones Act], it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, 
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States have historically been 
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sovereign.  Thus, if we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit 
any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.”  Id. at 564.   
Similarly, in Morrison, the Court analyzed legislation that targeted gender-motivated 
crimes.  See United States v. Morrison, 592 U.S. 598, 613-15 (2000).  Citing its decision in 
Lopez, the Court held that “gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity.”  Id. at 613.  As in Lopez, the Court in Morrison assessed whether an 
affirmative act—a gender-motivated crime—was substantially related to commerce.  Id.  
Congress attempted to rescue its legislation once again by citing findings that gender-motivated 
violence affects interstate commerce by interfering with travel and employment.  Id. at 615.  The 
Court cautioned, “the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the 
Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and 
local authority seems well founded.”  Id.  The Court rejected “the argument that Congress may 
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on the conduct’s aggregate effect 
on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 616-17. 
In accord with Lopez and Morrison, it cannot be said that inactivity, or the simple act of 
existing, rises to the level of a substantial effect on interstate commerce sufficient to support 
invocation of the Commerce Clause for the exercise of federal power.  Morrison and Lopez 
involved affirmative actions that the Court found outside the sphere of economic activity.  Even 
the Court’s broadest interpretations of the Commerce Clause have involved affirmative actions.  
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 84 (growing of wheat crop); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005) 
(growing of marijuana).  For that reason, the government’s reliance on Raich is inapposite.  
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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D. Similar Government Mandates Proceed Under State Police Powers, or 
Concern Interstate Channels, Thus Revealing the Extraordinary Nature of 
the PPACA’s Mandate 
 
The “regulation of health and safety is primarily and, indeed, historically a matter of local 
concern.”  See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 
707, 719 (1985).  Accordingly, Acts of Congress that purport to legislate within the arena of 
general police powers are suspect and must be grounded properly within the scope of an 
enumerated power granted to the federal government.  See U.S. v. Gaffney, 10 F.2d 694, 696 (2d 
Cir. 1926) (“the United states possesses whatever police power is appropriate to the exercise of 
any attribute of sovereignty specifically granted it by the Constitution”); Ensminger v. C.I.R., 
610 F.2d 189, 191 n.4 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[f]ederal deference in matters within the state police 
power reflects more than a policy of comity.  In fact, it represents a constitutionally derived 
recognition of the essential character of state government within our federal system”).  The states 
possess general police power to regulate the health and safety of their citizens.  For that reason, 
every form of mandate not derived from explicit constitutional authorizations are under the 
states’ general police powers.  See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12, 24-25 
(1905) (compulsory vaccination of citizens); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 (1962) 
(compulsory program for drug treatment); Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933) 
(compulsory automobile liability insurance).  Even the state of Massachusetts’ health reform 
laws, which served as a model for Congress when drafting PPACA, were founded on that state’s 
“police power” to act for the welfare of its citizens.  See Fountas v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Revenue, 
2009 WL 3792468 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2009), aff’d, 922 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009), rev. 
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den., 925 N.E.2d 865 (Mass. 2010); see also PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(D) (comparing PPACA with 
Massachusetts’ system).   
In their earlier motion to dismiss, arguing the identical issue now before the court on 
summary judgment, the Defendants took the position that Plaintiffs cannot properly “characterize 
their behavior as ‘inactivity’ beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.”  Def. Mot. to Dism. at 
32.  In support, the Defendants stated that “[t]he Sixth Circuit rejected the identical claim in 
United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).”  See Def. Mot. to Dism. at 32 
(citing United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997)).  Not so.  Defendants’ reliance on 
Faasse is misplaced.  If anything,  Faasse supports the Plaintiffs’ arguments.  Faase concerned 
the Child Support Recovery Act of 1991 (“CSRA”).  See Faasse, 265 F.3d at 478.  Moreover, 
the only activity at issue in Faase was predicated on the existence of a duty—the duty to pay 
child support—which was established first through the exercise of state police powers.  Faase 
certainly does not support a Congressional general police power and a Commerce Clause reach 
to inactivity. 
The CSRA criminalized the “willful failure to pay court-ordered child support for a child 
who resides in another state.”  Id.  The very nature of the crime required a willful breach of a 
valid court order.  When Timothy Faasse was convicted under the CRSA he had an outstanding 
court order to pay child support.  See Faasse, 265 F.3d at 479.  The CRSA defined the “past due 
support obligation” as “any amount determined under a court order … pursuant to the law of a 
State to be due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child…”  Id. (emphasis 
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added).  Thus, the CRSA required a predicate act before it could become enforceable against a 
citizen, and that predicate act arose in the context of state law.12   
In a similar case, U.S. v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit 
addressed Keith Douglas Bailey’s failure to pay child support under the CSRA.  The Bailey 
Court explains exactly why the Defendants’ arguments are misplaced: 
Addressing Bailey’s first contention, we point out that the CSRA is not a 
regulation of the nonuse of interstate channels.  Bailey made use of the interstate 
channels, as contemplated by the CSRA, the moment he moved away from Texas 
without fulfilling his child support obligation.  He himself thereby placed the debt 
in the flow of interstate commerce.  Bailey, therefore, is not doing nothing.  
Moreover, by failing to pay his debt, he is willfully violating a state court order 
requiring him to do something, viz., to consummate an interstate transaction. 
 
Id. at 1229-30 (emphasis added).  In this case, unlike in Bailey, the Plaintiffs are doing nothing. 
The need for economic activity is the sine qua non of the substantial effects doctrine.  If 
simply existing now constitutes economic activity subject to the Commerce Clause power, then 
nothing is beyond the reach of the government and our government has granted itself a general 
police power never allowed under Commerce Clause precedent. 
E. Assuming Arguendo Inactivity Is Activity Affecting Commerce, Congress’s 
Findings Do Not Include Those Who Are Over 400% Above the Poverty Line 
and Pay Out of Pocket for Their Health Care 
 
Congress enacted PPACA in part to control purported “cost-shifting” that results 
from uncompensated care.  The Defendants ask this Court to accept the following chain 
of inferences:  that the uninsured Plaintiffs are within a class that, in the aggregate, 
contributes to cost-shifting which, in turn, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce,  
                                                 
12 Faasse also involved an entirely separate category of Commerce Clause regulation 
than Lopez and Morrison, and the court explained that, “[w]e do know that the instant case 
indisputably involves the regulation of exclusively interstate transaction and that, as such, it does 
not implicate the Supreme Court’s preeminent concern in Lopez and Morrison, namely that 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power, taken too far, will erase the distinction ‘between what is 
truly national and what is truly local.’”  Id. (citing Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754).   
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but that factual presumption does not apply in the case of USCA Plaintiffs Grapek and 
Thompson.  In their affidavits they affirmatively aver that they presently pay out-of-
pocket for health care and will pay out of pocket for all future health care costs, including 
catastrophic ones.  See Grapek Affidavit, at ¶ 7; Thompson Affidavit at ¶ 8.   
 Whether a so-called “activity” substantially affects interstate commerce is for the Courts 
to decide without blind deference to the findings of Congress:  “[S]imply because Congress may 
conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily 
make it so.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2) (“the existence of 
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce 
Clause legislation”).  “Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to 
come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather 
than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 
n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J., concurring)); see also Maryland 
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 196 n. 27 (1968) (“[n]either here nor in Wickard had the Court declared that 
Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general 
regulation of state or private activities”); U.S. v. Ray, 189 Fed. Appx. 436, 447 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(courts must consider, inter alia, “whether the link between the prohibited activity and the effect 
on interstate commerce is attenuated”).   
 While this Court gives Congress deference concerning Congressional findings, in 
aggregating behavior under the “substantially effects” test, Congress cannot expand the class of 
regulable individuals far beyond the reasonable bounds of the targeted activity.  Congress must 
have a reasonable basis for its sphere of regulation or constitutional limits on the Commerce 
Clause power would evaporate.  If Congress can resort to the least common denominator, it may 
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repeatedly assume the most panoptic view and swallow unrelated activity within a Congressional 
scheme.  Through the PPACA’s Individual Mandate, Congress has done just that.   
This Court is duty bound to juxtapose Congress’s findings against the facts of this case.  
By doing so, the Court should conclude that USCA Plaintiffs Grapek and Thompson, and all 
citizens similarly situated, are not within the class Congress presumed to justify Commerce 
Clause regulation.  Consequently, even assuming arguendo that inactivity when aggregated 
constitutes regulable activity under the Commerce Clause, Congress offered no findings that 
those who earn above 400% of the poverty line and pay out of pocket for all health care costs 
contribute to cost-shifting burdens on the market for health care.  Indeed, there is no cost-shifting 
or burden shifting effected when people pay out of pocket for their health care.  The Defendants 
tacitly admitted that conclusion in earlier pleadings, writing in their motion to dismiss: 
As Congress understood, nearly two-thirds of the uninsured are in families with 
income less than 200% of the federal poverty level, H.R. REP. NO. 111-143, pt. II, 
at 978 (201); see also CBO, KEY ISSUES, at 27, while only 4% of those with 
income greater than 400% of the poverty level are uninsured.  CBO KEY 
ISSUES, at 11. 
 
Def. Mot. to Dism. at 6 (emphasis added).  Congress provided no facts linking cost-shifting or 
uncompensated care to the 4% earning more than 400% of the poverty line.  Congress had no 
rational basis, or any basis, linking those within that 4% subclass who pay out of pocket for care 
and intend to do so in future with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Defendants mislead when they presume that emergency room care, when necessary, is 
unaffordable to all uninsured.  In 2007, the average emergency room visit for patients aged 18-44 
cost $1,025.  See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Table 6, Emergency Room 
Services—Median and Mean Expenses per Person With Expense and Distribution of Expenses 
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by Source of Payment:  United States, 2007 (hereinafter “AHRQ Table 6”).13  The median cost 
was $529 per visit per person.  USCA Plaintiffs Grapek and Thompson intend to pay out of 
pocket for health care, including for catastrophic care.  The plaintiffs in this case are able to 
afford their care without the aid of insurance.  Congress certainly examined the uninsured 
population based on varying levels of income.  See CBO KEY ISSUES, at 11.  Congress did not 
deem those who earned above 400% of the poverty line and who also pay for health care out of 
pocket as people responsible for any cost or burden shifting to the general insurance market.  
Indeed, there is no evidence that such individuals do cause any such cost or burden-shifting. 
 
III. THE DEFENDANTS ERRONEOUSLY RELY ON THE NECESSARY AND 
PROPER CLAUSE AS A BASIS FOR REGULATION INDEPENDENT OF 
THE ENUMERATED POWERS IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 
 
The Defendants’ argument proceeds as follows:  (1) Congress has the power to regulate 
insurance under the Commerce Clause; (2) that power can be used to regulate insurance by, for 
instance, preventing pre-existing condition exclusions in the insurance market; (3) the Individual 
Mandate is necessary to enforce and implement those insurance reforms; and so (4) it is 
necessary to require citizens to buy insurance to support the insurance regulations.  Defendants 
thus propose that the mandate is necessary to a broader regulatory scheme.  Regardless of how 
necessary or “essential” the Defendants presume the mandate to be, it is beyond Congress’s 
authority unless proper under an enumerated power in Article I, Section 8.   
                                                 






(attached as Exhibit 8).  
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The Supreme Court has never held that “Congress can regulate wholly intrastate 
inactivity when doing so is deemed by Congress to be essential to a more general regulation of 
commerce.”  See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:  Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty (Forthcoming, 2011), at 29.14 
(explaining that “[t]here is nothing in either Lopez or Raich to warrant the additional step beyond 
current doctrine to compel that persons engage in economic activity when doing so is essential to 
a broader regulation of commerce”).  Therefore, to uphold the Individual Mandate under the 
Defendants’ “broad regulatory scheme” approach, the Supreme Court must go beyond its current 
doctrine.  “Unless the Supreme Court is prepared to use alchemy to convert a ‘decision’ not to 
act into activity, none of these proposed expansions of the Congressional power would justify the 
individual mandate.  Upholding the individual mandate would require going beyond existing 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine.”  Id. at 31.   
The Defendants’ effort to bootstrap citizens into interstate commerce using a “broader 
regulatory scheme” should give this Court pause because, if permitted, the Defendants’ 
interpretation would permit the Necessary and Proper Clause to become a limitless grant of 
authority to act independent of Article I, Section 8 enumerated powers.   
In PPACA Section 1501(a)(2)(B)-(H), Congress suggested that the very mandate itself 
has economic effects on interstate commerce.  See, e.g., H.R. 3590, Section 1501(a)(2)(C) 
(“[t]he requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will add millions of new 
customers to the health insurance market, increasing the supply of, and demand for, health care 
services”).  Thus, according to Congress, the PPACA is self-empowering as it bootstraps itself 
into interstate commerce.  Congress cannot compel activity through the Act, and then rely on that 
                                                 
14 Available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680392 (last visited December 1, 2010).   
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activity to justify the very creation of the Act itself.  That circular approach would destroy the 
enumerated powers doctrine.  Imagine if Congress could regulate any form of activity, in any 
manner, by also compelling in the same Act behavior that it could deem activity affecting its 
economic regulation and, thus, the regulated economy.  That is the very argument the Defendants 
make here.  That argument knows no limits.  That is not the test under the Commerce Clause.  
Congress’s legislation must reach interstate activities having a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce in the status quo ante.  Justice O’Connor addressed similar concerns in Raich.  See 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor worried that Congress would 
enjoy “a perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the Commerce Clause—nestling 
questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regulatory schemes—rather than with 
precision.”  Id.  That path promotes a larger, limitless national government where all citizen 
activity is “essential” to some national regulatory scheme.  That path is also in direct conflict 
with the concept of a dual federalist system.  
Legislation must be necessary and proper to Congress’s exercise of its enumerated 
powers.  The Supreme Court in McCullough v. Maryland explained the significance of the word 
“proper”:  “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”  See McCullough, 17 U.S. 
at 421 (emphasis added); see also U.S. v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1971-72 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[t]he means Congress selects will be deemed … ‘proper’ if they are not otherwise 
‘prohibited’ by the Constitution and not ‘[in]consistent’ with its ‘letter and spirit’”).  Regardless 
of whether Congress would welcome a much broader Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court 
has never read the doctrine to countenance ultra vires legislation. 
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The Defendants believe U.S. v. Comstock justifies the Defendants’ interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, as if that clause is a basis independent of the enumerated powers 
in Article I.  Rather, the Necessary and Proper Clause has always been held to allow Congress 
the authority to enact a statute that is “legitimately predicated on an enumerated power” and, 
even then, only where the means and the enumerated power do not become “too attenuated.”  See 
id. at 1963-64; see also McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
The Defendants cannot plausibly argue that the Individual Mandate is a necessary means 
to Congress’s broader congressional scheme because the Mandate itself is the end to be 
accomplished.  The Mandate is the goal, not an indirect or essential means to accomplish that 
goal.  Because the Necessary and Proper Clause is not an independent grant of authority, 
Congress cannot rely upon that clause alone; rather, it is an adjunct to an enumerated power. 
The Defendants’ reliance on Comstock is misplaced.  In Comstock, the Court made clear 
that action under the Necessary and Proper Clause must be “related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.”  Id. at 1956.  Nonetheless, Comstock demonstrates that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is not a vehicle to reach inactivity through government mandate.  
The Supreme Court relied on five “considerations” which, taken together, rendered the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act constitutional.  See id.  The Court looked to the following 
five factors:  first, whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the 
implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power (id. at 1956-57); second, whether a long-
standing history of similar federation action exists (id. at 1958-59); third, if a long-standing 
history exists, is the extension of that history reasonable (id. at 1961-62); fourth, whether the 
statute properly accounts for state interests (id. at 1962); and fifth, whether the link between the 
means chosen and an enumerated power are too attenuated (id. at 1963-64).   
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Even assuming Comstock greatly expands the Necessary and Proper Clause to include 
inactivity, the Individual Mandate still fails under the Comstock five factors test.  Id. at 1965 
(stating again that the AWCPSA was upheld because the five considerations, “taken together,” 
led the Court to “conclude that the statute is a necessary and proper means of exercising the 
federal authority”).  Unlike the Comstock facts, in this case the Mandate is not a means to a 
proper end at all.  It is a Congressional goal enacted directly by statute.  Congress has no history 
of directly compelling citizens to purchase goods or services, not in the insurance realm or 
elsewhere.  As explained above, federal mandates have been limited to specific instances and 
operable under enumerated authority.  States have a history of mandates which issue under the 
State’s police power, a general power the federal government lacks.  Because this is the first time 
in American history that Congress seeks to force the purchase of a private good or service, the 
Mandate and its penalty provision cannot be a reasonable extension of a pre-existing practice; 
there is no history.  The Mandate represents a broad expansion of Congressional power into the 
realm of general police powers thus invading the province of the States.  The power claimed by 
Congress has no principled limits; it is not narrow in scope as in Comstock.  It is hard to imagine 
a more sweeping provision than a Mandate which extends to all United States citizens.  By 
contrast with Comstock, the Mandate is not a “discreet and narrow exercise of authority over a 
small class of persons already subject to the federal power.”  Id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  Rather, the Mandate is a sweeping provision that compels millions of Americans to 
enter commerce against their will.  
We here first encounter an instance where the United States has asked the Court to use 
the Necessary and Proper Clause as an independent basis for legislation (to enact legislation not 
enumerated in the Constitution but actually prohibited by it).  Id. at 1957 (citing McCullough v. 
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Maryland, 17 U.S. at 421).  In a government whose charter is one of limited powers, the 
Constitution becomes meaningless if government may take any action conceivable in reliance 
solely on its self-serving notion of what is necessary and proper without regard to the Article I, 
Section 8 enumerated powers.  Under the Defendants’ construct, the Commerce Clause, the 
taxing and spending provisions, indeed everything in Article I can be viewed as surplusage 
because, in the end, the Necessary and Proper Clause permits all acts otherwise beyond the limits 
of this government.  There is in this a love of unlimited government antithetical to the limited 
government created by our Constitution. 
 
IV. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED WITH 
THE PPACA AS A WHOLE 
 
Under the law governing severability, an unconstitutional component of legislation may 
be set aside from the remaining portions unless “the balance of the legislation is incapable of 
functioning independently.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (citing Hill 
v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922)).  While often “elusive,” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 
(1983), the Sixth Circuit has declared that this may be determined by considering the “legislative 
intent” and inquiring “whether the legislature would prefer to have part of the statute remain in 
force.”  Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 333-34 (6th Cir. 2007); 
see also Western States Medical Center v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal 
statue could not be severed from unconstitutional sections “unless Congress would have enacted 
the constitutional provisions of [the statute] absent the unconstitutional provisions”); see also 
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987); Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 
F.2d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 1993).   
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Courts are cautioned, however, against creating constitutional laws on behalf of Congress 
and, thus, creating problematic circumstances where legislation was given power that was 
unintended by Congress.  See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S., at 685 (“[t]he more relevant inquiry in 
evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent 
of Congress”).  As stated by the Supreme Court in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern 
New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006),  
we are wary of legislatures who would rely on our intervention, for “[i]t would 
certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all 
possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside” to announce to whom 
the statute may be applied. …“This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial 
for the legislative department of the government.”   
 
Id. at 330 (citations omitted).  This Court must strike down all aspects of PPACA if it determines 
that PPACA is “incapable of functioning independently” of the unconstitutional individual 
mandate to procure a qualified health insurance plan.  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S., at 684. 
The PPACA does not contain a severability clause.  While the omission of a severability 
clause does not create a presumption that the PPACA must be upheld as a whole or not at all, see 
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion), the fact that Congress 
removed the clause that had been in previous versions of the bill is instructive of Congress’ 
intent that PAPCA was interdependent on all parts of the Act.  In PACCA, Congress specifically 
cited the individual mandate as “an essential part of this larger regulation,” and that its absence 
“would undercut Federal regulation of the health insurance market.”  PPACA §§1501(a)(2)(H), 
10106(a). 
The Defendants have acknowledged the same in this case, and in related cases, that 
PPACA cannot survive without the Individual Mandate.  See, e.g., Gov. Mot. to Dism. at xvii, 2, 
7, 21, 24, 27, 29, 30 (arguing the “essential” nature of the mandate as it relates to the intended 
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purpose of the PPACA and stating that the mandate “acts in tandem with the [PPACA]’s 
reforms”); Gov. Reply at 22-24 (stating “the minimum coverage provision is necessary to make 
[the PPACA] effective” and “[t]he minimum coverage provision is not only rationally related, 
but indeed is “essential,” to the implementation of these reforms”); State of Fla., No. 3:10-cv-91, 
Def. Mot. to Dism. (Dkt. No. 55-1), at 45-47 (“Congress found the minimum coverage 
provisions ‘essential’ to its broader effort to regulate health insurance industry practices…”).  It 
is thus without question that the PPACA cannot function as intended by Congress without the 
unconstitutional mandate contained therein because, as stated by the defendants, the mandate is 
necessary to “act[] in tandem with the [PPACA]’s reforms.”  As such, this Court must overturn 
the PPACA in its entirety because the PPACA is “incapable of functioning independently” of the 
unconstitutional individual mandate.  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S., at 684. 
Because the PPACA is incapable of functioning without the Individual Mandate, 
Plaintiffs request that this Court declare the entire act unconstitutional, and enjoin the Defendants 
from enforcing any provision of the invalid law.  
CONCLUSION 
 For the above stated reasons, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court 
grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declare the PPACA’s Individual Mandate 
unconstitutional and declare the PPACA inextricably intertwined with that mandate such that it 
too must be stricken.  The Plaintiffs likewise respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny 
Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.  
 
Respectfully submitted,  
      U.S. CITIZENS ASSOCIATION; 
      JAMES GRAPEK; 
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